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JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann., §54-1-2.5 provides that the Public Service 
Commission (••Commission11) shall comply with the requirements of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act in its adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann., §63-46b-16(l) further provides that the Utah 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review all final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. Moreover, this 
Court has jurisdiction over final orders issued by the Commission 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(e)(i). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. DOES THE COMMISSION HAVE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE SALE 
OF WATER OUTSIDE OF SANDYS MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES? 
II. DID THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINE 
THAT IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER MUNICIPAL WATER SYSTEMS 
THAT SERVE NON-CITY RESIDENTS? 
III. DID THE COMMISSIONS REFUSAL TO ALLOW AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF THE PARTIES' RIGHTS TO DUE 
PROCESS? 
IV. IS THE COMMISSION'S ORDER A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The Commission issued an Order determining that it has 
jurisdiction to regulate Sandy City's sale of water to non-
residents living in the unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County. 
The final Order contains Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in 
support of its determination. White City and Sandy allege that the 
Order was issued without an evidentiary hearing and lacks a factual 
basis. The proceedings before the Commission were "formal11 and 
review on appeal is limited to the administrative record. The 
appropriate standard of review under the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann., §63-46b-16, is the "substantial 
evidence" standard. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioners, White City Water Company and Sandy City, appeal 
from a final Order issued by the Commission finding that it has 
jurisdiction to regulate Sandy's sale of water to non-resident 
customers. The Commission's Order bifurcated the issue of the 
Commission's jurisdiction from the issue of approval of the 
contract for the sale of the stock of White City to the Municipal 
Building Authority of Sandy City. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The White City Water Company ("White City") is a water 
corporation, as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. §54-2-1(34) , 
and is regulated by the Commission as a public utility. White City 
filed an Application with the Commission to approve a contract with 
Sandy City, a municipal corporation ("Sandy"), under the terms of 
which, White City would transfer all of its outstanding stock to 
the Municipal Building Authority of Sandy City ("Building 
Authority"). In its Application, White City also seeks a 
determination that after the transfer, the water system will 
constitute a municipal water system not subject to the regulation 
of the Commission. 
Some time after the Application was filed with the Commission, 
the White City Water Users, Salt Lake County and Sandy filed 
petitions to intervene in the proceedings. The Commission allowed 
intervention and the parties subsequently submitted memoranda in 
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support of their respective positions regarding the proposed sale 
and the issue of the Commissions continuing jurisdiction. The 
Commission subsequently issued an Order bifurcating the issue of 
the Commissions jurisdiction and the issue of the public interest 
of the contract, finding that it has jurisdiction over Sandy's sale 
of water outside of its municipal boundaries to residents of the 
County. 
Following entry of the Order, White City and Sandy filed 
Petitions for Review and/or Reconsideration. The Commission denied 
the Petitions because they failed to raise issues not previously 
considered. White City filed a Petition for Review in this Court 
seeking a review of the Commission's Order. Sandy subsequently 
filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. Thereafter, this Court 
denied the motion and reserved the issues for further 
consideration. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 4, 1991, White City filed an Application 
("Application") advising the Commission that it had entered into an 
agreement with Sandy City and the Building Authority to sell all of 
its stock to the Building Authority. Sandy City would then lease 
and operate the water system. (R. 79). 
2. The Application contained the following material 
representations of fact, among others: 
a. White City is a corporation organized under and 
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah and having its 
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principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. (R. 79). 
b. Sandy City is a municipal corporation organized and 
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah 
and is located within the boundaries of Salt Lake County, 
Utah. (R. 79). 
c. The Building Authority is established and created 
pursuant to Title 17A, Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Ann., 
1953, as amended. (R. 79). 
d. On the 8th day of October, 1991, Sandy City and the 
Building Authority entered into a contract with White City 
whereby Sandy City, through its building authority, will 
acquire the stock of White City, pursuant to certain terms and 
conditions set forth in the contract. (R. 79). 
e. White City holds Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity No. 1121 issued by the Public Service Commission of 
Utah on the 11th day of May, 1955. (R. 80). 
f. The described geographical area is contiguous and 
lies partly within Sandy and partly within the unincorporated 
area of Salt Lake County. White City has approximately 3650 
customers plus 83 lines to residential lots, not yet 
connected. 42% of the connections are within the city limits 
of Sandy and 58% are in contiguous unincorporated Salt Lake 
County. (R. 81). 
g. As part of the terms of the Agreement, White City 
will remain intact as a corporation over the life of the bonds 
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which the Building Authority proposes to issue to raise 
capital for the acquisition of the stock of White City. 
Sandy, however# will operate the two systems on an integrated 
basis and requested an order from the Commission to the effect 
that such an integrated system will be considered a municipal 
system in its entirety under the laws of the State of Utah and 
thus be exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S17A-3-914(3) from 
the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission of Utah. 
(R. 84). 
3. On November 7, 1991, Sandy sought permission to intervene 
(R. 143) and in late November, 1991, White City water users 
petitioned to intervene. (R. 150). On December 9, 1991, the 
Commission held a prehearing and granted the proposed intervention 
of Sandy and White City water uses. (R. 158). 
4. The Commission conducted a prehearing conference 
December 9, 1991, when it set a discovery schedule and asked the 
parties to brief the legal authority of the Commission over the 
rates and service which may ultimately be provided to White City 
customers residing outside the boundaries of Sandy. (R. 164). 
5. Salt Lake County petitioned to intervene on December 26, 
1991 and intervention was granted on January 10, 1992. (R. 164). 
6. Oral arguments were heard by the Commission on 
February 18, 1992. (R. 302). 
7. The parties to the proceedings before the Commission 
submitted briefs, memoranda of law, briefs in response and briefs 
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in reply, including attachments and exhibits, on the issue of the 
Commission's jurisdiction. (R. 175 to 300). 
8. On February 20, 1992, the Commission issued its Order and 
severed the prayer for relief on the issue of the Commission's 
jurisdiction over Sandy after the sale from the balance of the 
proceedings and assigned that matter a separate docket number (No. 
91-018-02). The Commission denied the prayer for relief on the 
jurisdictional issue; and found that it has jurisdiction over Sandy 
to the extent that it provides retail water service beyond its 
boundaries as a general business. (R. 341). 
9. The Commission's Order contained the following Findings 
of Fact: 
a. Applicant, White City, is a water corporation 
certificated by this Commission. In its Application, White 
City seeks approval of a transfer of all its outstanding stock 
to an instrumentality of Sandy, a Utah municipal corporation. 
White City further seeks declaratory relief in the form of a 
Commission declaration that "the integrated system constitutes 
a municipal water system under the laws of the State of Utah." 
(R. 341). 
b. Under the proposed contract terms, the stock would 
be transferred to the Building Authority. White City would 
retain its corporate existence for the lifetime of the bonds 
issued by the Authority to finance the purchase. (R. 342). 
c. White City would cease operating the system and, for 
a nominal rental, would lease the system to the Building 
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Authority, which in turn would sublease to Sandy. Sandy would 
actually operate the system and, to the extent feasible, would 
integrate White City's present system with Sandy's municipal 
system. Payment to the bondholders would be made by the 
Authority out of rentals realized from the sublease to Sandy, 
which in turn proposes to pay the rental fees out of water 
charges to customers. (R. 342). 
d. In its brief, Sandy states explicitly that customers 
residing outside the city limits will be charged more than 
those residing within. The stated rationale is that the 
customers outside the city limits should bear a greater 
proportion of the costs of the acquisition. (R. 343). 
e. In the contract, the stock transfer is specifically 
conditioned upon this Commission's final Order declaring that 
the Commission does not have and will not assert any 
jurisdiction over Sandy, whether in regard to customers 
residing inside or outside the city limits. (R. 343). 
10. Following the entry of the Commission's Order, White City 
and Sandy filed Petitions for Review and/or Reconsideration with 
supporting memoranda. (R. 360 through 388). 
11. The Commission subsequently issued an Order on 
April 8, 1992, denying review because the Petitions failed to raise 
issues not previously considered. (R. 389). 
12. White City filed a Petition for Writ of Review in this 
Court on April 30, 1992, seeking a review of the Commission's 
Order. (R. 394). 
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13. Sandy City subsequently filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition on June 15, 1992, claiming that the Commission's Order 
was not a final cippealable order and alleging manifest error. 
(R. 453). 
14. This Court denied the Motion for Summary Disposition and 
reserved the issues for further consideration on August 28, 1992. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission properly determined that it hcts jurisdiction to 
regulate Sandy's sale of water to non-resident customers. The 
Commission bifurcated the issues of jurisdiction and public 
interest, and the Commission's order on jurisdiction is a final 
appealable order. 
The public interest demands regulation of the sale of water 
beyond municipal boundaries in order to avoid the 
disenfranchisement of non-resident customers. The majority (58%) 
of White City's connections serve customers in the unincorporated 
area. If it is determined that after the sale, the Commission will 
not have jurisdiction over the sale of water to non-resident 
customers, they will be deprived of both political and regulatory 
recourse against Sandy. 
The Commission properly determined that the sale of water to 
non-resident customers is not a protected municipal function. 
Sandy may sell surplus water without regulation. Surplus water is, 
by definition, limited in both quantity and dureition. Sandy can 
terminate service to non-residents without notice any time the 
demand for suplus water in the city exceeds supply. 
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Sandy intends to acquire the White City system for the purpose 
of re-selling water as a general business. The re-sale of water to 
non-resident customers is not merely incidental to its own use, and 
is not protected as a municipal function. The constitutional 
prohibition on the exercise of jurisdiction over a city/s municipal 
functions does not, therefore, apply. 
The issue of the public interest of the proposed contract is 
separate and apart from the jurisdictional matter and was assigned 
a separate docket number by the Commission. The matter of the 
Commission's jurisdiction over Sandy after the sale must be finally 
resolved before the issue of the public's interest in the contract 
can be determined. 
The final order provisions contained in Rule 54(b) of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to administrative 
proceedings. The Commission satisfied the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act's ("UAPA") requirements, including the exhaustion of 
remedies provision. The procedural requirement of a final order, 
if any, was satisfied and this matter is properly before the Court 
on appeal. 
The Commission's refusal of an evidentiary hearing did not 
constitute a denial of the parties' rights to due process. White 
City relied on the facts contained in its Application and requested 
the Commission to make a legal determination on its jurisdiction 
based solely on those facts. The appropriate standard of review on 
appeal is the whole record standard, because White City and Sandy 
allege the Commission's order was issued without an evidentiary 
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hearing and, therefore, lacks a factual basis. A comparison of the 
facts contained in the Application and the Commission's findings of 
fact, establishes that sufficient uncontroverted facts exist in the 
record as a whole to support the Commission's order. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PUBLIC INTEREST DEMANDS REGULATION OF THE SALE OF 
WATER OUTSIDE OF SANDY'S MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES. 
Salt Lake County ("County") intervened in the proceedings 
before the Commission to represent its interests and the interests 
of residents of the unincorporated County served by White City. In 
addition to the fact that the County owns property in the 
unincorporated areai served by White City, the County's interests in 
the sale of the water system to Sandy include: the potential 
disenfranchisement of non-residents; the likelihood that 
differential rates will be established for residents and non-
residents; the availability of adequate service after the sale; 
and, the possibility that Sandy will use water service as leverage 
to force an involuntary annexation of unincorporated areas served 
by the system. 
A. LIKELIHOOD OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND DIFFERENTIAL 
RATES. 
Paragraph six of White City's Application (sometimes referred 
to as the "Petition") for approval of the Contract of Sale, 
describes the affected service area as follows: 
The above described geographical area is 
contiguous and lies partly within Sandy City 
and partly within the unincorporated area of 
Salt Lake County. White City Water Company 
has approximately 3650 customers plus 83 lines 
to residential lots, not yet connected. 42% 
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of the connections are within the city limits 
of Sandy City and 58% are in contiguous Salt 
Lake County, (Emphasis added). (R. 81). 
The County clearly has an interest in this matter because the 
majority (58%) of White City's connections serve residents of the 
unincorporated contiguous areas. 
The White City system is regulated by the Commission, and 
residents in the unincorporated area of the County served by the 
system have recourse to the Commission. If Sandy acquires the 
system, and it is determined that the Commission does not have 
jurisdiction to regulate service beyond Sandy's municipal 
boundaries, the non-residents will no longer have a forum to hear 
their grievances, including such matters as the setting of rates, 
the quality of service and similar issues. 
The issue of representation is significant because Sandy has 
explicitly stated that customers residing outside of its municipal 
boundaries will be charged more than those residing within the 
City. (Finding of Fact #4. R. 343). Obviously, non-residents 
cannot vote in City elections and will have no voice or control 
over the affairs of the City.1 
In an analogous case, CP National Corporation v. Public 
Service Commission. 638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981), this Court noted that 
Utah Code Ann., §10-8-14 allows the incidental disposal of utility 
surplus, but does not allow the continuing distribution of power 
1
 The record contains a number of letters from individual 
residents of the unincorporated area opposing the sale to Sandy. 
(R. 142 through 340). Also, the Petition to Intervene of White 
City Water Users describes the reasons behind local opposition to 
the proposed sale. (R. 150). 
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outside of municipal boundaries. The Court explained that extra-
territorial limitations are justified because municipally owned 
utilities are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, 
but are controlled by the administration of the municipality. The 
Court stated: 
Customers who are non-residents of the 
municipalities would be left at the mercy of 
officials over whom they have no control at 
the ballot box, and they could not turn to the 
Public Service Commission for relief. At 524. 
Furthermore, Sandy will have the ability to terminate service 
beyond its municipal boundaries without notice or hearing. This 
circumstance will leave the non-residents without a meaningful 
recourse to any regulatory entity, public or private. The argument 
advanced by White City and Sandy in their brief, that any adverse 
action taken by Sandy can be challenged in court as an ultra vires 
act, provides no protection because it will force the residents of 
the unincorporated area to incur the substantial time delays and 
costs associated with litigation every time they seek redress. 
B. THREAT TO CONTINUED AVAILABILITY OF ADEQUATE 
SERVICE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "SURPLUS" WATER. 
Sandy relies on Utah Code Ann. §10-8-14(1) as authority to 
construct, maintain and operate water works as a municipal 
function. Sandy further relies on that section for authority to 
sell and deliver surplus capacity not required by the City or its 
inhabitants to others beyond the boundaries of the City. The 
critical importance of the characterization of "surplus11 water, is 
that it implies the existence of a temporary excess in supply that 
is not needed or required by City residents. This characterization 
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is particularly significant in Utah, an arid state where water is 
a scarce and finite resource. Surplus water must, by definition, 
be considered to be limited in both quantity and duration. 
This Court considered the application of §10-8-14 and the 
jurisdiction of the Commission over the sale and delivery of water 
beyond municipal limits, in County Water System, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
City, 3 U.2d 46, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954). The Court, interpreting 
§10-8-14, noted: 
The water must of necessity be committed to 
the use of the city when the need arises 
therein. Therefore, no long term assurance of 
continued supply to outside customers can be 
given. At 290. 
The Court relied on the temporary nature of a surplus in 
support of its holding that Salt Lake City was not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission for certain purposes. Likewise, in 
CP National Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 638 P.2d 519 
(Utah 1981) the Court observed that §10-8-14 does not contemplate 
continuing utility service beyond municipal boundaries because 
municipally owned utilities are not subject to regulation by the 
Commission. 
The temporary nature of surplus water was again underscored by 
this Court in Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P.2d 119 
(Utah 1977). In that case, the Court considered Salt Lake City's 
ability to extend water service beyond its municipal boundaries. 
The Court noted that the City had no binding obligation to continue 
service to non-residents. Moreover, in Thompson v. Salt Lake Citv 
Corp.. 724 P.2d 958 (Utah 1986), the Court ruled that a 
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municipality operating a waterworks is not obligated to provide 
service to all members of the public, including resident property 
owners. 
Given the tentative nature of surplus water and the lack of 
any continuing obligation of Sandy to provide service beyond its 
municipal boundaries, a very real threat exists to the continued 
availability of adequate and reliable service at reasonable rates. 
As a result, the health, safety and general well being of non-
residents is at risk. Among other things, the County is concerned 
about the availability of water in sufficient quantities and 
pressures to provide adequate fire protection in the affected 
unincorporated areas. Because the County provides services in 
these unincorporated areas, it has a legitimate interest in 
assuring that adequate water service is not jeopardized. 
The County also has an interest in making sure that the 
existing infrastructure for water is not dismantled and sold to 
another political subdivision for a purpose unrelated to providing 
adequate water service. If, for example, Sandy acquires the White 
City system, it may use the threat of terminating service to non-
resident customers as leverage to force an involuntary annexation 
of the unincorporated areas currently served by White City. 
II. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
IT HAS JURISDICTION OVER WATER SUPPLIED TO NON-RESIDENTS. 
A. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SALE OF WATER TO NON-RESIDENTS 
IS NOT A "MUNICIPAL" FUNCTION. 
Sandy proposes to extend water service beyond its municipal 
boundaries to non-resident customers living in the unincorporated 
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area of the County. These customers are now served by the White 
City Water Company, which is currently regulated by the Commission. 
Sandy has gone on record stating that it intends to charge higher 
rates to non-residents. (R. 194). By extending service beyond the 
municipal boundaries at rates higher than those charged to 
residents, Sandy will be performing more as a traditional utility 
than a municipal corporation.2 
As previously noted, Utah Code Ann. §10-8-14(1) permits a city 
to sell its surplus beyond corporate limits. The acquisition of a 
water system for the sole purpose of reselling water to non-
residents is another matter. In County Water System. Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City. 3 U.2d 46, 278 P.2d 285 (Utah 1954), this Court found 
that Salt Lake City could acquire, own, control and manage a water 
system and could sell any surplus beyond its corporate limits. The 
Court noted, however, that the ability to sell water beyond its 
corporate limits was incidental to the use of water for its own 
purposes. 
The Court observed that the incidental sale of surplus water 
was not intended to permit the City to purchase water solely for 
resale, nor "...to construct, own or manage facilities and 
equipment for the distribution of water outside of its city limits 
2
 Utah Code Ann., §54-2-1(19)(f) regulates the sale of surplus 
capacity from any person or corporation not engaged in business as 
a public utility to a regulated utility. Before approving a 
contract for the sale of the surplus, the Commission must 
determine, after a public hearing, whether the contract is in the 
public interest. By analogy, the same regulatory concern regarding 
the public interest should apply to the extraterritorial sale of 
surplus water by a municipality. 
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as a general business." At 290. The Court went on to note that 
due to the temporary and incidental nature of the sale of surplus 
water, it did not believe that regulation by the Commission was 
necessary. 
In Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P.2d 119 (Utah 
1977), this Court found that in furnishing water to its residents 
and to others incidentally, the City was not subject to regulation 
by the Commission. The Court went on to note, however, that the 
extent to which a city may engage in rendering a utility service 
outside of its city limits without being subject to some public 
regulation "is not so clearly determined." At 122.3 Given the 
fact that 58% of the connections serve non-residents, Sandy's 
acquisition of the White City system is not merely incidental to 
the City's own use.4 
If Sandy intends to sell surplus water, it can terminate 
service to non-residents, without notice, any time the demand for 
water in the City e.xceeds the supply. If, on the other hand, Sandy 
intends to sell something more than a temporary excess of supply, 
it will violate the surplus sale provision of the statute. Sandy 
3
 The Commission's Order cited the Salt Lake County case in 
its Order and observed that the Supreme Court remanded the case for 
a determination on the issue of Salt lake City's amenability to 
regulation of extraterritorial service. As noted in the Order, the 
subsequent course of that litigation is unknown. (R. 353). 
4
 As noted in the Commission's Order, the Building Authority 
is involved in the transaction only in a "belt and suspenders" 
attempt to insulate the real principals and it has no real role or 
participation in the arrangement. The limitations on the municipal 
function argument, therefore, apply to the Building Authority as 
well as the City. 
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does not have statutory authority to sell water beyond its 
corporate boundaries as a general business. The re-sale of water 
to non-residents, as a general business, is an ultra vires act and 
is not protected as a municipal function. 
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON THE EXERCISE OF 
JURISDICTION OVER A CITY'S MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS DOES 
NOT APPLY. 
In their brief, White City and Sandy assert that the 
Commission is prohibited by Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah 
Constitution from interfering with Sandy's municipal activities. 
This constitutional provision, sometimes referred to as the 
"ripper" clause, essentially restricts the Legislature from 
delegating to any "special commission" the power to perform any 
municipal function. White City and Sandy urge in their brief, that 
the sale of water beyond Sandy's corporate limits constitutes a 
municipal function and that Article VI, Section 28 prohibits the 
Commission from interfering. 
In City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 
530 (Utah 1988) , this Court rejected any hard or fast 
categorization of specific functions as "municipal" or "state". 
Instead, the Court advocated a balancing test which considers a 
number of factors including: 
...the relative abilities of the state and 
municipal governments to perform the function, 
the degree to which the performance of the 
function affects the interests of those beyond 
the boundaries of the municipality, and the 
extent to which the legislation under attack 
will intrude upon the ability of the people 
within the municipality to control through 
their elected officials the substantive 
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policies that affect them uniquely. At 534. 
(Emphasis added)• 
The West Jordan case acknowledges that the State has a 
legitimate interest in considering the impact of Sandy's 
acquisition of the White City water system on the* residents of the 
unincorporated areas of the County currently served by the system. 
In Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service 
Commission of Utah, 789 P.2d 298 (Utah 1990), this Court applied 
the balancing test developed in the West Jordan case and determined 
that rather than categorizing an activity cis a "municipal11 
function, the activity in question must be evaluated in light of 
the purposes of Article VI, Section 28. 
Here, the function under consideration is the sale of water 
outside the municipal boundaries of Sandy to non-resident customers 
living in the unincorporated area of the county. This function is 
currently performed by White City, a water company regulated by the 
Commission. Under the test developed in the West Jordan case, the 
sale of water to non-residents involves more of a state regulatory 
interest than an exclusively local interest and is sufficient to 
avoid the characterization of a municipal function.5 
5
 The Commission noted this in its Order and stated: "By 
purposely acquiring an existing public utility, and thereby taking 
over the obligation to serve 58 percent of the customers of an 
existing certificated public utility, Sandy is stepping outside the 
exercise of its municipal function and subjecting itself to state 
regulation of rates for those extraterritorial customers surplus." 
(R. 351). 
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C. SANDY MUST ASSUME WHITE CITY'S REGULATORY 
OBLIGATIONS. 
White City is a water company and operates under a Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity issued by the Commission. The 
Commission regulates the service provided by White City to its 
customers including, the reasonableness of rates, the adequacy of 
service and other such matters. It is reasonable to conclude that 
if Sandy buys the stock and takes over the service provided by 
White City, it must also be subject to the same regulations. 
In North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co.. 223 
P.2d 577 (Utah 1950), North Salt Lake condemned the St. Joseph 
Water & Irrigation Company, a water company regulated by the 
Commission. The Court found that when the town condemned the water 
company, the regulatory obligations imposed upon the water company 
carried over and the town was required to meet those obligations. 
Following the reasoning in the North Salt Lake case, Sandy 
City should be obligated to comply with the regulatory requirements 
imposed by the Commission, governing the extraterritorial sale of 
water to non-residents. 
III. THE COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF THE PARTIES' RIGHTS TO DUE 
PROCESS. 
A. WHITE CITY RELIED ON THE FACTS CONTAINED IN THE 
APPLICATION AND CONTRACT FOR SALE. 
White City relied on the facts contained in its Application 
for Approval of the proposed Contract of Sale to Sandy and 
requested the Commission to make a legal determination on its 
jurisdiction after the sale based solely on those facts. (R. 79). 
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The Application specifically requested the Commission to find that 
after the sale, the system would be a municipal water system and 
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. (R. 84). The 
record is clear that had the Commission ruled in favor of White 
City on the jurisdictional issue, White City and Sandy would not 
have been concerned about the factual basis for that determination. 
B. A FACTUAL HEARING WAS NOT NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE 
COMMISSION'S DETERMINATION. SUFFICIENT UNCONTRO-
VERTED FACTS ARE CONTAINED IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION. 
White City's Application and the contract contain facts 
sufficient to support the Commission's decision on the issue of 
jurisdiction. The following uncontroverted facts recited in the 
Application, among others contained in the record as a whole, were 
specifically relied on by the Commission and incorporated in its 
Findings of Fact: 
1. White City is a corporation organized under and pursuant 
to the laws of the State of Utah and having its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R. 79). 
2. Sandy is a municipal corporation organized and existing 
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah and is located 
within the boundaries of Salt Lake County. (R. 79). 
3. The Building Authority is established and created 
pursuant to Title 17A, Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
amended. (R. 79). 
4. On the 8th day of October, 1991, Sandy and the Building 
Authority entered into a contract with White City whereby Sandy, 
through its municipal building authority, will acquire the stock of 
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White City, pursuant to certain terms and conditions set forth in 
the contract. (R. 80). 
5. White City holds Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
No. 1121 issued by the Commission on the 11th day of May, 1955. 
(R. 80). 
6. The described geographical area is contiguous and lies 
partly within Sandy City and partly within the unincorporated area 
of Salt Lake County. White City has approximately 3650 customers 
plus 83 lines to residential lots, not yet connected. 42% of the 
connections are within the city limits of Sandy and 58% are in 
contiguous Salt Lake County. (R. 81). 
7. As part of the terms of the Agreement, White City will 
remain intact as a corporation over the life of the bonds which the 
Building Authority proposes to issue to raise capital for the 
acquisition of the stock of the White City Water Company. Sandy, 
however, will operate the two systems on an integrated basis and 
requests an order from the Commission to the effect that such an 
integrated system will be considered a municipal system in its 
entirety under the laws of the State of Utah and thus be exempt 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., S17A-3-914(3) from the jurisdiction of 
the Commission. (R. 85). 
In addition to the foregoing facts recited in the Application, 
Sandy's Memorandum of Law concerning the Commission's jurisdiction 
(R. 191), contains additional undisputed facts regarding the 
acquisition and proposed operation of White City's system. 
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A comparison of the facts contained in the Application and the 
Commission's Findings of Fact,6 establishes that sufficient 
uncontroverted facts exist in the record taken as a whole to 
support the Commission's decision on the issue of jurisdiction.7 
IV. THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER. 
The Commission's Order, issued February 20, 1992, severed the 
issues raised in the Application, involving the Commissions 
jurisdiction and the public interest of the proposed contract. The 
Commission assigned a separate docket number (91-018-02) to that 
portion of its Order declaring that it has jurisdiction over 
Sandy's sale of water to non-residents. 
The issue of the public interest of the proposed contract is 
separate and apart from the jurisdictional matter and has been 
assigned a separate docket number (91-018-01). The Commission's 
Order is, therefore, final on the issue of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. 
Following the Commission's Order, White City and Sandy 
separately filed Petitions for Review and/or Reconsideration (R. 
360 & 362). The Commission denied the Petitions for Review (R. 
389) and White City subsequently filed a Petition for Writ of 
Review with this Court. (R. 394). Presumably, White City acted in 
5
 The facts contained in the Application parallel the 
Commission's Findings of Fact. (Compare R. 79 with R. 341). 
7
 UAPA §63-46b-10(l)(a) provides that an order shall include 
"...a statement of the presiding officer's Findings of Fact based 
exclusively on the evidence of record in the adjudicative 
proceedings or on facts officially noted.11 (Emphasis added). 
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good faith and considered the Commission's Order to be final at the 
time it filed the Writ of Review. 
A. THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT OF A FINAL ORDER HAS 
BEEN SATISFIED. 
After reaching a decision, Utah Admin. Code R750-100-10(C) 
provides that the Commission "shall draft a report and order, which 
upon the signature of two commissioners, shall become the Order of 
the Commission." Here, the Order satisfies all of the conditions 
set forth in the rule for a final order. Furthermore, Utah Code 
Ann., §54-7-10(1) provides that orders of the Commission "shall 
take effect and become operative on the date issued." 
B. RULE 54(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
DOES NOT APPLY TO THE COMMISSION'S ORDER. 
In their brief, White City and Sandy represent that the 
Commissions Order does not address the public interest of the 
contract and the Order is not, therefore, a final order under Rule 
54(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. This argument fails, 
however, because the Commission follows the procedures and 
requirements of UAPA, Utah Code Ann., Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its 
adjudicative proceedings. This explains why all of the cases cited 
by White City and Sandy are based on appeals from proceedings in 
the district courts, and not appeals from administrative 
agencies.8 
8
 White City and Sandy cite the following district court cases 
in support of their contention that the Commission's order is not 
a final order under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure: 
1. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin. 817 P.2d 298 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). 
2. Olsen v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. . 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986). 
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This Court addressed the application of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure to administrative hearings in Entre Nous Club v. Toronto, 
4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (Utah 1955), and found that the rules 
[of Civil Procedure] do not apply to a proceeding before an 
administrative body seeking to regulate activities burdened by the 
public interest. At 672. Rule 54(b) does not, therefore, apply to 
the Commission's Order. 
UAPA S63-46b-8 sets forth the procedures for formal 
adjudicative proceedings; and §63-46b-10 summarizes the contents of 
a final order. All of the procedural requirements set forth in 
UAPA were satisfied by the Commission. 
UAPA contains an exhaustion of remedies provision in 
§63-46b-14(2) and (3). This provision was interpreted in Sloan v. 
Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In that case, 
an appeal was taken from an Industrial Commission order. The order 
adopted certain findings of fact made by the administrative hearing 
officer, but remanded other matters for further determination. The 
Court ruled that the order was not a final order under §63-46b-14. 
The holding in Sloan is distinguishable under the facts of the 
present case, because the Commissions Order on jurisdiction was 
severed from the contract matter and assigned a separate docket 
number. The issue of the Commissions jurisdiction over Sandy's 
3. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm' n. , 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 
1991). 
4. Webb v. Vantage Income Properties, 818 P.2d 1 (Utah 1991). 
5. Manila v. Broadbent Land Co., 818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991). 
All of the cases cited involved appeals from district court 
proceedings, not appeals from administrative agencies. 
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sale of water to non-residents was not dependent on the resolution 
of the public interest of the contract. The Commission's Order is 
final on the issue of its jurisdiction over Sandy's sale of water 
to non-residents. 
C THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TEST IS THE APPROPRIATE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL. 
As previously noted, the Commission follows UAPA's procedural 
requirements in its adjudicative proceedings.9 UAPA distinguishes 
between formal and informal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-15 gives the district courts jurisdiction to review 
informal adjudicative proceedings by trial de novo. Formal 
proceedings, on the other hand, are governed by §63-46b-16, which 
provides that this Court has jurisdiction to grant relief if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that the party 
seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by one of the 
circumstances described in that section. 
In their brief, White City and Sandy contend that the Order 
was issued without an evidentiary hearing and was based on the 
Commission's interpretation of constitutional and statutory law. 
White City and Sandy fail to establish the absence of a factual 
basis in the record and they claim, without more, that the 
appropriate standard of review is de novo. The proceedings before 
the Commission were formal, however, and the review in this Court 
should be limited to the Commission's record, applying one of the 
standards described in §63-46b-16(4). 
See, Utah Code Ann., §54-1-2.5. 
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Because White City and Sandy claim that the Commission's Order 
was issued without an evidentiary hearing and, allegedly, lacks a 
factual basis, the appropriate standard of review is described in 
§63-46b-16(4)(g) as follows: 
The agency action is based upon a determina-
tion of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court. (Emphasis added)• 
The "whole record" or "substantial evidence" standard of 
review is described in Grace Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 
63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . In that case, an employer petitioned for 
a review of an Industrial Commission decision awarding unemployment 
compensation benefits. The employer challenged whether the 
findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence as required 
under §63-46b-16(4)(g). Grace was a case of first impression for 
the whole record standard of review under UAPA. Following an 
analysis of the standards relied on prior to UAPA,, the Court stated 
that: 
In applying the substantial evidence test, we 
review the whole record before the court, and 
this review is distinguishable from both a de 
novo review and the any competent evidence 
standard of review. Moreover, under the whole 
record test, a court must consider not only 
the evidence supporting the Board's factual 
findings, but also the evidence that fairly 
detracts from the weight of the evidence. It 
is also important to note that the whole 
record test necessarily requires that a party 
challenging the Board's findings of fact must 
marshall all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the supporting 
facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence. At 68. 
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As more fully explained in Point III herein, the Commission's 
record, taken as a whole, contains a sufficient factual basis to 
support the Commission's decision of the jurisdictional issue. 
White City and Sandy have failed to "marshall all of the evidence 
and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings of fact are not 
supported by substantial evidence." 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's Order was final on the issue of its 
jurisdiction over Sandy's sale of water to non-resident customers 
after the conclusion of the transaction with White City. The Order 
is, for all purposes, final and is properly before this Court on 
appeal. 
The County has a substantial interest in the sale of the White 
City system to Sandy not only because it owns property in the 
service area, but because 58% of the connections serve residents of 
the unincorporated county. White City is currently regulated by 
the Commission and its customers have recourse to challenge rates 
and the quality of service. If it is determined that after the 
sale, the Commission will no longer have jurisdiction over the sale 
of water to non-resident customers, they will be deprived of both 
political and regulatory recourse against Sandy. 
White City and Sandy rely on the statutory authority of 
municipalities to sell surplus water without regulation. The 
concept of "surplus11 is, however, problematic. By definition, 
surplus water is limited in both quality and duration. If the 
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water supplied to non-residents is characterized as surplus, Sandy 
can terminate service to non-resident customers without notice any 
time the demand for water in the city exceeds supply. If, however, 
Sandy intends to acquire the system for the purpose of reselling 
the water as a general business, it is no longer performing a 
protected municipal function. 
The Commission properly determined that it has jurisdiction to 
regulate Sandy's sale of water to non-resident customers. The 
regulation of services beyond municipal boundaries is a role 
typically assumed by the state. A balancing of interests requires 
that the Commission retain extraterritorial jurisdiction in order 
to avoid depriving non-resident customers of both political and 
regulatory recourse against Sandy. 
For the reasons set forth herein, the Commission's Order 
determining that it has jurisdiction to regulate Sandy City's sale 
of water to non-resident customers living in the unincorporated 
County should be affirmed. 
DATED this // day of February, 1993. 
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By the Commission: 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The application in this matter was filed November 4, 1991. The 
Commission conducted a prehearing conference December 9, 1991, and 
asked the parties to brief the issues of the Commission's 
jurisdiction to approve the contract which is the subject of these 
proceedings and, should the contract be approved, the Commission's 
jurisdiction over Sandy City in connection with water customers 
residing outside the city. Oral arguments were heard by the 
Commission on February 18, 1992. Having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Commission enters the following Report and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Applicant is a water corporation certificated by this 
Commission. In its Application, Applicant seeks approval of a 
transfer of all its outstanding stock to an instrumentality of 
Sandy City Corporation, (hereafter "Sandy") a Utah municipal 
corporation. Applicant further seeks declaratory relief in the 
form of a Commission declaration that "the integrated system 
constitutes a municipal water system under the laws of the 
State of Utah." 
2. Under the proposed contract terms, the stock would be 
transferred to the Municipal Building Authority of Sandy City 
(hereafter "the Authority"). Applicant would retain its 
corporate existence for the lifetime of the bonds issued by the 
Authority to finance the purchase. 
3. Applicant would cease operating the system and, for a nominal 
rental, would lease the system to the Authority, which in turn 
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would sublease to Sandy. Sandy would actually operate the 
system and, to the extent feasible, would integrate Applicant's 
present system with Sandy's municipal system. Payment to the 
bondholders would be made by the Authority out of rentals 
realized from the sublease to Sandy, which in turn proposes to 
pay the rental fees out of water charges to customers. 
4. In its brief, Sandy states explicitly that customers residing 
outside the city limits will be charged more than those 
residing within. The stated rationale is that the customers 
outside the city limits should bear a greater proportion of the 
costs of the acquisition. 
5. In the contract, the stock transfer is specifically conditioned 
upon this Commission's final Order declaring that the 
Commission does not have and will not assert any jurisdiction 
over Sandy, whether in regard to customers residing inside or 
outside the city limits. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As we view it, Applicant seeks two separate and distinct forms 
of relief—approval, per se, of the contract, and declaratory relief 
in regard to the Commission's jurisdiction. We deem the declaratory 
branch of the proceeding so important that it should be severed from 
the approval branch. 
The subject transaction differs from other transfers hitherto 
considered by the Commission in that the transfer is to an entity 
arguably outside Commission jurisdiction. It would leave a number of 
customers, who have had recourse to the Commission for grievances, 
effectively without recourse to any entity, public or private. Given 
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that stark fact, we refuse to take the "all or nothing" choice 
presented by Applicant. Instead, we propose to resolve the 
jurisdictional issue in this proceeding, with the docket number in 
the caption above, as a matter separate from the contract approval. 
In light of our action in this proceeding, Applicant may choose to 
proceed or not in the approval action. 
We turn now to the merits of the jurisdictional issue. 
We concede at the outset that we have no authority to regulate 
a municipality within its boundaries. However, we conclude that case 
law, statutory law, and public policy support our authority to 
regulate Sandy's water service outside its boundaries. In reaching 
this conclusion, we believe the salient considerations include 
disenfranchisement of the extra-territorial customers, Sandy's 
limited statutory powers, the structure of the transaction, our 
doubts that service outside the city boundaries would constitute 
exercise of a municipal function, and our skepticism that Sandy would 
indeed be selling surplus water as contemplated by the Utah statutes. 
Disenfranchisement of the Customers 
At present, all of Applicant's customers, inside and outside 
the city limits, have recourse to the Commission to ensure just and 
reasonable rates. Absent our involvement in Sandy's ratemaking 
outside its boundaries, the customers would have no means to prevent 
Sandy from charging excessive rates. In its initial brief, Sandy 
states that the customers are not "entirely" disenfranchised, since 
they can attend Sandy City public meetings. (Sandy, Initial Brief, at 
9). 
no.* M 
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We deem the assertion less than ingenuous. One cannot be 
partially disenfranchised; either one can vote or not. Clearly the 
customers located outside Sandy's boundaries do not have a right to 
vote in Sandy City. The opportunity to attend meetings is a poor 
substitute for the right to reward or punish via the ballot. 
The fact that Sandy proposes to charge a differential rate 
immediately upon approval of the transaction is a strong indication 
of how the "outside11 customers would fare under the proposal. 
Indeed, we can predict with considerable confidence, that in case of 
conflict between the interests of franchised and disenfranchised 
customers, the interests of the former will receive priority—no 
matter how vociferous the protests raised in meetings. 
Limitation of Sandy's Statutory Powers 
Unquestionably, as Sandy asserts, the Commission is a creature 
of statute with all the limitations on power and jurisdiction that 
implies. However, Sandy itself stands in much the same position; its 
powers are circumscribed also. See State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 
1116, 1121 (Utah 1980).1 
We proceed first on the premise that if Sandy takes over the 
utility service of White City Water Company, the city must also take 
on the utility's obligations. According to our Supreme Court in 
North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co. 223 P.2d 577 
The Hutchinson Court actually broadened a municipality's 
authority by holding that the powers delegated by the Legislature 
should be liberally construed. The Court's rationale was that local 
democratic institutions should be strengthened, thus empowering 
citizens in regard to the local affairs most immediately affecting 
them. Were we to adopt the Applicant's position, we would, of 
course, actually disempower the extra-territorial customers, running 
counter to the Hutchinson rationale. 
rsn A e? 
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(Utah 1950) , when North Salt Lake condemned a water company, it took 
upon itself the obligations imposed upon the water company, including 
the effect of an Order issued by this Commission before the 
condemnation.2 
Other jurisdictions have extended the principle explicitly to 
include rate regulcition. For example, in City of Orangeburg v. Moss, 
204 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 1974), the court held that the South Carolina 
PSC had jurisdiction to regulate a municipality operating electrical 
facilities outside its boundaries. The court held that the 
constitutional grant of Power to municipalities by the State to 
operate electrical facilities was not a limitation on the power of 
the State to regulate those activities through the PSC or otherwise. 
It is the position of the plaintiff in the current action 
that this constitutional grant of power to the 
municipalities of the State to operate electrical 
facilities is a limitation on the power of the State of 
South Carolina to regulate those activities through the 
Public Service Commission or otherwise. The writer does 
not agree. He feels that the section in question was no 
more than a constitutional provision to permit certain 
municipal activities previously held ultra vires and that 
2At the time of that hearing the water company was a 
utility subject to the rules and regulations of the 
Public Service Commission and its findings and orders 
were binding on the company, its successors, those 
claiming through or under it, and those later dealing 
with it. 
* * * 
If limitations were imposed on the water company in the 
hearing before the Public Service Commission, then 
condemnation of the property by the town would not unblock 
the controls. The . . . town takes the franchise and 
property subject to all burdens of furnishing water that 
were imposed at the time of transfer. 
Id. at 223 P.2d 577. If a previous Commission Order is binding on a 
town clearly exercising a municipal function, a fortiori the town is 
subject to Commission regulation when exercising a non-municipal 
function. 
n <:* A a 
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it is not to be construed as limiting the powers of the 
State to regulate such activities. (emphasis added.) 
Id. at 378. It is true that South Carolina had in place legislation 
specifically empowering their PSC to regulate extra-territorial 
service. The issue, nevertheless, was the constitutionality of that 
legislation, and we believe there is scant difference in principle 
between that case and this. 
It is not unreasonable to suppose that one of the obligations 
Sandy may be required to assume is that of state regulation of rates 
charged to customers residing outside the city limits. 
As derogating from the foregoing analysis, we have been cited 
Article XI, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution which provides a 
municipality the authority to furnish public utility services "local 
in extent and use"; Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-914 (3) ; the Municipal 
Building Authority Act; the 1988 amended definition of "person" under 
Utah Code Ann. § 4-2-2; and Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 which gives a 
municipality authority to condemn a water system. We do not 
perceive any of these provisions as denying us authority to regulate 
rates charged by Sandy for water service outside its boundaries. 
Article XI, Section 5, gives Sandy the power to furnish public 
utility services, but not necessarily the power to set extra-
territorial rates, particularly in light of the "local in extent and 
use" provision, which has no obvious meaning other than as a 
reference to the City's boundaries. 
Any prohibition by the Municipal Building Authority Act is 
irrelevant in this proceeding. As noted in the Findings of Fact 
above, the sole role of the Authority is to be a conduit. 
Obviously, Sandy could issue and service its own bonds. We strongly 
DOCKET NO, 91-018-02 
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suspect the Authority is involved in the transaction only in a "belt 
and suspenders" attempt to insulate the real principals, Applicant 
and Sandy, from our jurisdiction. We believe we are entitled to 
assess the substance, not the mere form, of the transaction. So 
assessing the transaction, it is obvious the Authority has no real 
role or participation in the arrangement, and its presence should be 
disregarded. 
It is true that in 1988 the Legislature deleted "governmental 
entity" from the definition of "person." Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-2 
(1988). Our perusal of the Legislative history of this change, 
however, does not indicate that the Legislature intended! to foreclose 
our regulation of a city's extra-territorial retail water customers. 
(See transcript of the Legislative history on this amendment, 
Exhibit "A" to Reply Brief, White City Water Users). 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 does give a municipality power 
to condemn a water system, but it does not necessarily give a 
municipality power to set utility rates for extra-territorial retail 
customers. In a condemnation proceeding, a city is limited by strict 
laws to protect the new owners of those systems and the citizens 
served thereby. Indeed, as noted earlier, the St. Joseph Water case, 
supra, suggests that water systems acquired by condemnation carry 
with them all their regulatory baggage. 
Sandy does not have specific delegated authority to serve water 
outside its boundaries without state regulation. Where there are 
gaps in the coverage of applicable statutes, as in the instant case, 
we believe that legislative intent should be interpreted so as to 
A O A O 
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protect constitutional rights of citizens, which in this case are the 
extra-territorial retail customers• 
The Nature of the Arrangement 
As noted above, Sandy has made great efforts to avoid our 
jurisdiction in the way it has set up the proposed transfer. The 
elaborate nature of the arrangement between White City, the 
Authority, and Sandy, renders the arrangement suspect. 
Sandy's initial brief claims that neither White City, the 
Authority, nor Sandy are subject to our regulation. (Sandy, Initial 
Brief, at 6-14) . As noted above, the role of the Authority is 
explicable only as an attempt to avoid our jurisdiction. Given the 
expressed intent to charge extra-territorial customers differential 
rates, Sandy's good faith, in structuring the transaction as it has, 
must be questioned. 
Sandy is Not Performing a Municipal Function 
Should Sandy provide water service to White City's extra-
territorial customers, it would, to that extent, not be exercising a 
municipal function. Sandy would be acting as a traditional utility 
(exercising a business function) and therefore would be subject to 
regulation. 
Sandy claims that Utah Constitution Art. VI, Section 28, 
prohibits us from interfering with Sandy's municipal functions. 
(Sandy, Initial Brief, at 7). Obviously, we agree that we cannot 
interfere with Sandy's municipal functions, but we maintain that 
Sandy's proposed service to the extra-territorial customers is not a 
municipal function. 
DOCKET NO. 91-018-02 
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Recent Utah cases support our position. In Utah Associated 
Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, 789 P.2d 298 
(Utah 1990), in which Art. VI, Section 28, was at issue, the Court 
discussed the alleged "municipal function" performed by Utah 
Associated Municipal Power Systems ("UAMPS") in attempting to 
construct a utility line and to provide utility service. UAMPS 
resisted the jurisdiction of the Commission on constitutional 
grounds, arguing that they were political subdivisions exercising 
municipal functions, even though part of their service area was 
located outside, or would have a substantial impact outside, the 
boundaries of the political subdivisions. 
The UAMPS Court applied a balancing test first enunciated in 
City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Board, 767 P.2d, 530 
(Utah 1988). Under that test, no particular activity conducted by a 
municipality is ipso facto a municipal function for purposes of Art. 
VI, Section 28. Instead, a functional analysis is to be conducted, 
considering such factors as 
the relative abilities of the state and municipal 
governments to perform the function, the degree to which 
the performance of the function affects the interests of 
those beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and the 
extent to which the legislation under attack will intrude 
upon the ability of the people within the municipality to 
control through their elected officials the substantive 
policies that affect them uniquely.3 
3Id. at 534. The Court went on to say the balancing test would 
best serve the Constitutional purpose without "erecting mechanical 
conceptual categories that, without serving any substantial interest, 
may hobble the effective government which the state constitution as 
a whole was designed to permit." Ibid. In the instant case, of 
course, the only "substantial interest" our assuming jurisdiction 
would affect would be that of Sandy in "milking" the extra-
territorial customers to the maximum extent possible. 
DOCKET NO, 91-018-02 
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Applying that test, the UAMPS Court had little difficulty in finding 
that the construction of the utility transmission line for the 
purpose of generating, buying and selling electricity across the 
state was outside the ambit of Art. VI, Section 28. Utah Associated 
Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, supra, 789 P. 
2d at 302. 
The present proposal is closely analogous to the UAMPS case. 
In particular, those residing outside Sandy stand to be severely 
impacted, while our assuming jurisdiction in regard to them would 
have minimal impact on Sandy's legitimate interests. By purposefully 
acquiring an existing public utility, and thereby taking over the 
obligation to serve 58% of the customers of an existing certificated 
public utility, Sandy is stepping outside the exercise of its 
municipal function and subjecting itself to state regulation of rates 
for those extra-territorial customers surplus. 
Sandy attempts to bolster its position by referring to Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-14(1) concerning sale of surplus water by a 
municipality. A careful reading of this statute, however, weighs 
against Sandyfs proposal and in favor of the extra-territorial 
customers. 
According to the statute, a city "may sell and deliver the 
surplus product or service capacity of any such works, not required 
by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the 
city. . . . " In attempting to show that it would be serving 
"surplus" water in accordance with this statute, Sandy states that it 
"has more than ample capacity to serve the non-Sandy White City 
customers and will therefore in fact be selling •surplus1 water to 
DOCKET NO. 91-018-02 
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them upon acquisition of the White City system." (Sandy, Initial 
Brief, at 8) . This interpretation is contrary to Utah case law on 
the subject and contrary to a common sense definition of "surplus." 
In support of Sandy's interpretation of surplus, it cites 
County Water System v. Salt Lake City. 278 P 2d 285 (Utah 1954) and 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P 2d 119 (Utah 1977) 
In County Water System, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that the authority of municipalities to sell utility services beyond 
its corporate boundaries was limited to the disposal of surplus 
water. Id. at 289. 
In fact, after first delineating a municipality's powers of 
surplus water disposal in sweeping terms, Justice Crockett, writing 
for the Court, appears to have had immediate second thoughts. In his 
next paragraph, he hedged the municipality's authority: 
But such permissive sale of surplus water . . . is clearly 
not calculated to permit the city to purchase water solely 
for resale, nor to construct, own or manage facilities and 
equipment for the distribution of water outside of its 
city limits as a general business. 
Id. at 290. 
The Court also made clear its concept of surplus water—a 
temporary glut occasioned by provision for prudent future expansion. 
This would, according to the court, foreclose a municipality's 
commitment to purchasers of surplus water for any long-term supply. 
Ibid. Under this concept, if Sandy is indeed to sell surplus water, 
the extra-territorial customers stand to be left literally high and 
dry in the near to medium term. 
In this case, however, Sandy will not be disposing of surplus 
water it now possesses—it will be surplus only by virtue of Sandy's 
0359 
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calculated acquisition of a class of captive, disenfranchised 
customers—precisely the situation Justice Crockett inveighed 
against. 
Sandy cites Salt Lake County, supra, for the proposition that 
"[A municipality's] business in furnishing water to its residents and 
activities reasonably incidental thereto is not subject to 
regulation by the Public Service Commission." Id. at 570 P.2d 121-
122. Sandy, however, fails to quote the complete paragraph. The 
next, and more relevant sentence is: "But iust however great an 
extent a city may engage in rendering a utility service outside its 
citv limits without being subject to some public regulation is not so 
clearly determined." (emphasis added.) The second sentence is not 
mere dictum. The case involved the propriety of a summary judgment 
rendered by the district court, and the Supreme Court remanded for 
determination of precisely the issue of a municipality's amenability 
to regulation of extra-territorial service. We do not know the 
subsequent course of the litigation. 
The Salt Lake County case evidences to us the Court's concern 
with precisely the potential for abuse presented by the instant 
proposal. We think it would be difficult to find a clearer instance 
of a city's stepping over the boundary of legitimate surplus water 
sales under the statute. 
Our conclusion is strengthened by C.P. National Corporation v. 
Public Service Commission. 638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981), According to 
the Court, 
" . . . We believe that [Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14] imposes 
a limitation on a city operating outside its borders. It 
negates the proposition that a city could purposely engage 
in the distribution of power to localities or persons 
AQ 
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outside its limits except to dispose of surplus.ft [Citing 
County Water System, supra]. In the instant case, the 
municipalities intend to continue to serve a large area 
outside any of their limits. . . . 
Section 10-8-14 does not contemplate nor authorize a city 
to so operate its electric light and power works. There 
is good justification for this limitation since 
municipally owned utilities are not subject to the 
jurisdiction and supervision of the Public Service 
Commission but are controlled solely by the 
administration of the city or town wherein thev are 
located . . . customers who are non-residents of the 
municipalities would be left at the mercy of officials 
over whom thev have no control at the ballot box and thev 
could not turn to the Public Service Commission for 
relief. (emphasis added.) (citations omitted.) 
Id. at 524. 
We can only add that the situation is not one whit different 
when a municipality purposefully acquires an existing, regulated 
water system. While there may be no explicit statutory authority for 
us to assume jurisdiction, the obvious remedy for the abuse of extra-
territorial customers is for us to continue to regulate their rates; 
otherwise, to meet the Court's concern, the instant proposal would 
have to be found ultra vires.4 
If there is a common thread running through the history of 
economic regulation in the United States, it is the abhorrence of 
unchecked monopoly. We see no reason to suppose that a monopoly held 
by a municipality over powerless extra-territorial utility customers 
would be any more benevolent than a monopoly held privately. Sandy's 
expressed intent to impose higher rates immediately upon the extra-
4That is the course the Court took in the CP National case. The 
main issue was the constitutionality of the municipalities' acquiring 
an existing electrical utility by condemnation. The Court assumed 
without discussion that we would have no jurisdiction over rates 
charged the extra-territorial customers. One wonders if the same 
result would have been reached had the Court considered the 
jurisdictional issue and applied the City of West Jordan test. 
02 
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territorial customers is ample demonstration of the reason we are 
unwilling to cede jurisdiction in these circumstances. 
We conclude that in the event the proposal presented by 
Applicant were to be approved by the Commission, the Commission would 
retain jurisdiction to regulate rates charged the extra-territorial 
retail customers, at least to the extent of nullifying invidious 
discrimination. Accordingly, Applicant's prayer for a declaratory 
judgment to the contrary should be denied. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
» On the Commission's own motion, the prayer of WHITE CITY WATER 
COMPANY, for a declaration that, should the Commission approve 
a transfer of the stock of said company to the Sandy City 
Building Board, pursuant to the contract delineated in said 
Company's application, the Commission would have no 
jurisdiction thereafter to set rates for customers residing 
outside the boundaries of Sandy City, be, and the same hereby 
is, severed from the balance of the proceeding and given the 
Docket Number 91-018-02; 
» Said prayer is denied; 
» Any party aggrieved by this Order may, within 30 days of the 
issuance hereof, petition for review; failure so to do will 
forfeit the right to such review, as well as the right to 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. 
0355 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day of February, 
1992 . 
ATTEST: 
•/a y\^L Jultiie Orchard 
Commission Secretatry 
uz7t%<\/ 
Chairman Briaif T. S t e w a r t , 
?pt 
J^nd^s M. Byrne, C o n c e s s i o n e r 
StepheA C. H e w l e t t , Commi 
Commissioner 
Pro Tempore 
A 9 C ^ 
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION 
OF WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY FOR 
COMMISSION APPROVAL OF A CONTRACT 
ENTERED INTO ON THE 8TH DAY OF 
OCTOBER, 1991, UNDER WHICH 
CONTRACT SANDY CITY AND THE 
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY OF 
SANDY CITY, UTAH, WILL PURCHASE 
ALL OF THE OUTSTANDING STOCK OF 
WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY 
White City Water Company hereby petitions and 
represents to the Commission as follows: 
1. White City Wat^r Company is a corporation 
organized under and pursuant to the laws of the State of 
Utah and having its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
2. Sandy City is a municipal corporation organized 
and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State 
of Utah and is located within the boundaries of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
3. The Municipal Building Authority of Sandy 
City, Utah, is established and created pursuant to Title 17A, 
Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
4. On the 8th day of October, 1991, Sandy City 
and the Muncipal Building Authority of Sandy City entered 
.off? 9 
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into a contract with White City Water Company whereby Sandy 
City, through its municipal building authority, will acquire 
the stock of White City Water Company, pursuant to certain 
terms and conditions set forth in the contract, a copy of 
which contract is marked Exhibit A and attached hereto. 
5. White City Water Company holds Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity No. 1121 issued by the Public 
Service Commission of Utah on the 11th day of May, 1955, 
authorizing the Company to: 
(a) Construct, maintain and operate a water system 
consisting of a water well located in Section 8, 
Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian 
in Salt Lake County, Utah having a capacity of 
approximately 1,200 gallons of water per minute 
with a pipe line leading from said well to a 500,000 
gallon reservoir located in Section 9 , Township 3 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian 
with a pipe line leading from said storage tank 
to the area to be served with the necessary distribution 
lines, service lines and other facilities to serve 
water for domestic, culinary and other purposes 
within the area bounded on the West by the East 
line of 7th East Street, on the East by 20th East 
Street, on the North by 94th South Street and 
on the South by 120th South Street in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
(b) To construct, maintain and operate such additional 
wells, pipe lines and extended water system facilities 
as may be necessary from time to time to adequately 
serve water for domestic, culinary and other purposes 
within the area above specified. 
-2-
^ft£ift 
6. The above described geographical area is 
contiguous and lies partly within Sandy City and partly 
within the unincorporated area of Salt Lake County. White 
City Water Company has approximately 3650 customers plus 
83 lines to residential lots, not yet connected. 42% of 
the connections are within the city limits of Sandy City 
and 58% are in contiguous Salt Lake County. 
7. Sandy City has constructed and maintained 
a municipal culinary water system rendering service to approxi-
mately 21,050 residential, commercial, and industrial customers 
within the limits of Sandy City. The Sandy City water system 
is an efficient and well-maintained system having facilities 
to deliver water to its customers. The water system at present 
has facilities which are fully sufficient to provide storage 
and pressure to its existing customers as well as to the customers 
of White City Water Company if this contract is approved. 
8. White City Water Company has a distributing 
system sufficient to serve its current customers. White 
City Water Company also has water rights which during 
ordinary years are fully sufficient to give adequate and 
continuous water service to its customers. However, White 
City Water Company lacks adequate facilities for the 
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storage of water at a sufficient elevation to provide sufficient 
pressure to adequately serve its customers and, in case 
of an emergency draw down, a lack of sufficient storage 
capacity to meet a prolonged emergency. In order to adjust 
for this situation. White City Water Company has arrangements 
whereby it will sell certain water at its wellheads to the 
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and purchase 
back at a very much higher price from the Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy District water delivered at a sufficient 
elevation and in sufficient quantities to provide both pressure 
and adequate flow in emergency situations. This arrangement 
is an expensive one for White City Water Company as it receives 
for its water at the wellhead under this contract $20.00 
per acre foot while it pays for the water delivered at the 
higher elevations the sum of $125.22 per acre foot. This 
contract with the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
is subject to cancellation by the parties. Furthermore, 
the price to be charged for the water that is delivered 
is almost exclusively at the discretion of the Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District. Thus White City Water 
Company is under constant threat of either discontinuance 
of this service or the pricing of the service at a level 
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which is unacceptable to White City Water Company and its 
customers who would bear the ultimate responsibility of 
paying for these services through higher rates. 
9. White City Water Company has attempted to 
get permission to construct additional storage facilities 
on property which it owns in Sandy City and which is of 
sufficient elevation to provide adequate pressure. Sandy 
City, however, has been unwilling to grant a variance from 
zoning ordinances to permit the construction of such storage 
facilities and this Commission has declined to use its authority, 
if such authority it has, to compel Sandy City to grant 
such variance. White City Water Company has explored other 
sites outside Sandy City as a possible location for constructing 
new storage facilities; however, all such available sites 
are expensive to purchase, remote from the White City Water 
Company's distribution system and its wells and would entail 
the expenditure of money beyond the present resources of 
White City Water Company. If it were possible to borrow 
funds for such construction, it would require substantially 
higher rates from the customers of White City Water Company 
in order to service the debt and amortize the investment 
of such additional storage facilities. 
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10. Sandy City already has in existence or under 
construction sufficient storage facilities to provide adequate 
volume and pressure for White City Water Company customers 
if operation of the two systems were integrated. 
11. While White City Water Company customers 
now pay generally lower rates than Sandy City charges to 
its customers for similar service, this situation will not 
prevail for long if White City must continue to render the 
service to its customers on its own. The cost of maintaining 
an aging system and the cost of required new facilities 
as above described will in the near future require White 
City Water Company to raise its rates substantially for 
it to continue as a viable corporation. 
12. The water systems cf White City Water Company 
and Sandy City are well matched for integration. The approval 
of this application is in the public interest and will result 
in better service to all customers of White City Water Company 
and Sandy City in the foreseeable future. 
13. As part of the terms of the agreement, the 
White City Water Company wll remain intact as a corporation 
over the life of the bonds which the municipal building 
authority of Sandy City proposes to issue to raise capital 
-6-
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for the acquisition of the stock of White City Water Company• 
Sandy City, however, will operate the two systems on an 
integrated basis and requests an order from this Commission 
to the effect that such an integrated system will be considered 
a municipal system in its entirety under the laws of the 
State of Utah and thus be exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 174A-13-914(3) from the jurisdiction of the Public Service 
Commission of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, applicant prays that this matter be 
set down for hearing and that upon such hearing the Commission 
approve the contract described above and find that the integrated 
system constitutes a municipal water system under the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
DATED this 31st day of, 
Calvin L. Rampton 




STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, 
) ss. 
) 
John E. Papanikolas, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says that I am the President of White City Water 
Company, that I have read the foregoing Application and 
that the same is true and complete to the best of my knowledge 
and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ / day 
of October, 1991. 
My Commission Expires: 
(/ 
*>^JL^£„.S *& 
Notary Public < = ^ ^ 
Residing at ^ ^ ^ ***£/ **//', 
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10-8-14. Water, sewer, gas, electricity, telephone 
and public transportation — Service 
beyond city limits — Retainage es-
crow. 
(1) They may construct, maintain and operate wa-
terworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment systems, 
gas works, electric light works, telephone lines or 
public transportation systems, or authorize the con-
struction, maintenance and operation of the same by 
others, or purchase or lease such works or systems 
from any person or corporation, and they may sell 
and deliver the surplus product or service capacity of 
any such works, not required by the city or its inhab-
itants, to others beyond the limits of the city. 
(2) If any payment on a contract with a private 
person, firm, or corporation to construct waterworks, 
sewer collection, sewer treatment systems, gas works, 
electric light works, telephone lines, or public trans-
portation systems ia retained or withheld, it shall be 
placed in an interest bearing account and the interest 
shall accrue for the benefit of the contractor and sub-
contractors to be paid after the project is completed 
and accepted by the board of commissioners or city 
council of the city. It is the responsibility of the con-
tractor to ensure that any interest accrued on the 
retainage is distributed by the contractor to subcon-
tractors on a pro rata basis. 1983 
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17A-3-914. Supplemental to other laws — Non-
applicability of other laws — Valida-
tion of existing building authorities. 
(1) This part is supplemental to all existing laws 
relating to the acquisition, use, maintenance, man-
agement, or operation of projects by public bodies. 
(2) It shall not be necessary for a public body or a 
building authority to comply with the provisions of 
other laws concerning the acquisition, construction, 
use, and maintenance of projects, including, but not 
limited to, public bidding laws and the Utah Procure-
ment Code, where the projects are acquired, ex-
panded, or improved under this part. 
(3) No board, commission, or agency of the state, 
including the Utah Public Service Commission, shall 
have any jurisdiction over building authorities or 
projects. 
(4) No ordinance, resolution, or proceeding in re-
spect to any transaction authorized by this part shall 
be necessary except as specifically required in this 
part nor shall the publication of any resolution, pro-
ceeding, or notice relating to any transaction autho-
rized by this part be necessary except as required by 
this part Any publication made under this part may 
be made in any newspaper conforming to the terms of 
this part and in which legal notices may be published 
under the laws of Utah, without regard to the desig-
nation of it as the official journal or newspaper of the 
public body. No resolution adopted or proceeding 
taken under this part shall be subject to referendum 
petition or to an election other than as permitted in 
this part All proceedings adopted under this part 
may be adopted on a single reading at any legally-
convened meeting of the governing body or the board 
of trustees of the authority as appropriate. 
(5) Any formal action or proceeding taken by the 
governing body of a public body or the board of 
trustees of an authority under the authority of this 
part may be taken by resolution of the governing 
body or the board of trustees as appropriate. 
(6) This part shall apply to all authorities created, 
projects undertaken, leasing contracts executed, and 
bonds issued after this part takes effect 
(7) All proceedings heretofore taken by a public 
body in connection with the creation and operation of 
a public building authority are hereby validated, rati-
fied, approved, and confirmed. ^Mi 
TITLE 54 
PUBLIC UTILITIES 
54-1-2JL Procedures — Adjudicative proceed-
ings. 
Except as specifically provided to the contrary in 
Chapter 7, the commission shall comply with the pro-
cedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in 
its adjudicative proceedings. 1987 
§ 5 4 - 2 - 1 ( 1 9 ) ( f ) 
(f) IT any person or corporation not en* 
gaged in business as a public utility as de-
fined by this section is able to produce a sur-
plus of electric energy or power, gas, or 
water beyond the needs of its own business 
and desires to sell, exchange, deliver, or oth-
erwise dispose of the surplus to or with any 
public utility as defined in this section, the 
public utility desiring to effect a purchase or 
exchange of the surplus shall submit to the 
commission, for authorization by the com-
mission, a proposed contract covering the 
purchase or exchange. The commission shall 
then determine, after a public hearing, 
whether, in the public interest it is advisable 
that the contract be executed and, if not ad-
verse to the public interest, the commission 
shall authorize the execution of the contract. 
The public utility shall then have the right 
to purchase and receive or exchange the sur-
plus product in accordance with the terms of 
the contract. The person or corporation sell-
ing or exchanging the surplus product under 
the authorized contract is not considered a 
public utility within the meaning of this sec-
tion, nor is it subject to the jurisdiction of the 
commission. 
§54-2-1(34) 
(34) "Water corporation19 includes every corpo-
ration and person, their lessees, trustees, and re-
ceivers, owning, controlling, operating, or man-
aging any water system for public service within 
this state. It does not include private irrigation 
companies engaged in distributing water only to 
their stockholders, or towns, cities, counties, 
water conservancy districts, improvement dis-
tricts, or other governmental units created or or-
ganized under any general or special law of this 
state. 
54-7-10. Orders on hearings — Time effective. 
(1) Orders of the commission shall take effect and 
become operative on the date issued, except as other-
wise provided in the order. 
(2) They shall continue in force for the period des-
ignated in the order, or until changed or abrogated by 
the commission. 1987 
63-46b-& Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) 
and (ii), in ail formal adjudicative proceedings, a 
hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the 
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of 
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reason-
able opportunity to present their positions. 
2\(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a 
party, the presiding officer 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrele-
vant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in 
the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in 
the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or 
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the 
original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts 
that could be judicially noticed under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of 
other proceedings before the agency, and of 
technical or scientific facts within the 
agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evi-
dence solely because it is hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all par-
ties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not 
a party to the adjudicative proceeding the oppor-
tunity to present oral or written statements at 
the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if 
offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a 
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the 
agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a 
person approved by the agency prepare a tran-
script of the hearing, subject to any restrictions 
that the agency is permitted by statute to impose 
to protect confidential information disclosed at 
the hearing, 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding of-
ficer from taking appropriate measures necessary to 
preserve the integrity of the hearing. 1968 
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings — Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hear-
ing, or after the filing of any post-hearing papers 
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the 
time required by any applicable statute or rule of 
the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and 
issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's 
findings of fact based exclusively on the evi-
dence of record in the adjudicative proceed-
ings or on facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's 
conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the pre-
siding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by 
the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for recon-
sideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative 
or judicial review of the order available to 
aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any recon-
sideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer may use his experi-
ence, technical competence, and specialized 
knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) No finding of fact that was contested may 
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that 
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presid-
ing' officer from issuing interim orders to: 
(a) notify the parties of further hearings; 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings 
on a portion of the issues presented; or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and effi-
cient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding. 
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63-46b-14» Judicial review — Exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicial 
review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after ex-
hausting all administrative remedies available, ex-
cept that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter 
or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judi-
cial review of the requirement to exhaust any or 
all administrative remedies i£ 
(i) the administrative remedies are inade-
quate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring ex-
haustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial re-
view of final agency action within 30 days after 
the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued or is considered to have 
been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all 
other appropriate parties as respondents and 
shall meet the form requirements specified in 
this chapter. 1968 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceed-
ings, except that the juvenile court shall have 
jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating 
to removal or placement decisions regarding chil-
dren in state custody. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the 
party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or brief description of 
the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding; 
,(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief^  specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief, 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
termine all questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section. iseo 
63-46b-l& Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rale on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic-
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law, 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro-
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi-
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac-
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis-
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious, isss 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdic-
tion. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals: 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudica-
tive proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and For-
estry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capi-
tal felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Su-
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex-
cept: ,
 c 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal ot 
an interlocutory order of a court of record involv-
ing a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and 
(e) those matters described in Subsections 
(3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. i*92 
